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Abstract. Expert surveys have been used to measure a wide variety of phenomena in political science,
ranging from party positions, to corruption, to the quality of democracy and elections. However, expert
judgments raise important validity concerns, both about the object being measured as well as the experts.
It is argued in this article that the context of evaluation is also important to consider when assessing the
validity of expert surveys. This is even more important for expert surveys with a comprehensive, world-
wide scope, such as democracy or corruption indices. This article tests the validity of expert judgments
about election integrity – a topic of increasing concern to both the international community and aca-
demics. Evaluating expert judgments of election integrity provides an important contribution to the lit-
erature evaluating the validity of expert surveys as instruments of measurement as: (1) the object under
study is particularly complex to define and multifaceted; and (2) election integrity is measured in widely
varying institutional contexts, ranging from electoral autocracies to liberal democracies. Three potential
sources of bias are analysed (the object, the experts and the context), using a unique new dataset on
election integrity entitled the ‘Perceptions of Electoral Integrity’ dataset. The data include over 800
experts in 66 parliamentary and presidential elections worldwide. It is found that validity of expert judg-
ments about election integrity is increased if experts are asked to provide factual information (rather
than evaluative judgments), and if they are asked to evaluate election day (rather than pre-election)
integrity. It is also found that ideologically polarised elections and elections of lower integrity increase
expert disagreement about election integrity. The article concludes with suggestions for researchers using
the expert survey data on election integrity on how to check the validity of their data and adjust their
analyses accordingly, and outlines some remaining challenges for future data collection using expert
surveys.
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Introduction
Expert surveys are increasingly common in comparative and international studies.
They have been applied to research on party and policy positioning (Laver & Hunt
1992; Huber & Inglehart 1995; Laver 1998a, 1998b; Laver et al. 2006; McElroy & Benoit
2007; Saiegh 2009), the power of prime ministers (O’Malley 2007), evaluations of
electoral systems (Bowler et al. 2005) and policy constraints horizons (Warwick 2005), as
well as in research on corruption, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index
(Transparency International 2013), and research on varieties of democracy (Coppedge
et al. 2011).
However, expert surveys raise important validity concerns. For example, as Steenbergen
and Marks (2007) and Budge (2000) point out in the case of expert surveys on party
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positions, experts may evaluate different objects (the party-in-parliament, the-party-in-the-
electorate, etc.), use different evaluation criteria and differ in their level of expertise. In
addition to these concerns, the challenges to the validity of expert surveys are likely to be
even more profound when the object that is evaluated is complex, and the context of
evaluation moves beyond established democracies. Concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘corrup-
tion’ and ‘electoral integrity’ fall into this category. How useful are expert surveys in this
case?
In this article we seek to answer these questions by presenting and analysing a new
dataset on electoral integrity. Evaluating expert judgments on election integrity is impor-
tant as the object under study is particularly multifaceted and complex to define; and the
concept is measured in widely varying institutional contexts, ranging from electoral autoc-
racies to liberal democracies. The article hence also contributes to the literature evalu-
ating the validity of expert surveys by proposing ways in which researchers can test
the validity of expert surveys when measuring complex concepts in varying institutional
contexts.
We analyse three sources of bias that may arise in expert evaluations: the object, the
experts and the context. These sources of bias are applicable to almost all expert surveys.
First, the object of evaluation may be defined and perceived differently by different experts.
Election integrity is a complex, multifaceted concept, and different experts may emphasise
different aspects, ranging from media bias to election violence. Second, experts may differ,
both in their level of expertise as well as in their degree of political neutrality.Third, contexts
may differ – that is, expert evaluations may be context-bound, limiting the capacity of both
concepts and data to ‘travel’ (Sartori 1970).
We test these three sources of bias and evaluate expert judgment validity using a new
dataset on expert perceptions of election integrity – the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity
(PEI) dataset1 – which includes information on 49 indicators of election integrity, col-
lected from over 800 experts, for 66 parliamentary and presidential elections around the
world in 2012 and 2013, covering countries as diverse as Angola, Kuwait, Malaysia and
Norway.
Our results indicate that even when treating complex issues in diverse contexts, such as
electoral integrity, expert surveys are useful. Regarding the object of evaluation, we find
that disagreement among experts is higher when faced with more difficult questions and
evaluative (rather than factual) questions, and when asked to evaluate pre-election day
integrity. However, we find very little systematic variation in expert judgments of election
integrity at the level of experts, elections and countries. We barely find any systematic
pattern for explaining experts’ judgment variance, even after controlling for a considerable
number of individual characteristics, which is a good sign of measurement validity. This
result is reinforced when we consider the context as a source of divergence among experts,
as most election and country characteristics do not appear to significantly affect experts’
judgment variance, with the exception of ideological polarisation and overall election
integrity.
The article is organised as follows. We begin by discussing the limitations of expert
surveys before presenting the expert survey we use to test our claims. Thereafter, we
provide the results of the statistical analyses so as to evaluate the validity of experts’
judgments. We conclude with a discussion of the results and suggestions for researchers
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using the expert survey data on election integrity on how to check the validity of their data
and adjust their analyses accordingly.
Experts and contexts: Limitations of experts’ views
Trusting expert judgments is not risk free. Budge (2000) raises several points on the
uses and limitations of expert judgments of party policy positions: what object is evalu-
ated, which criteria are used and how do expert characteristics influence their judgments?
His concerns are common to all expert surveys, including those on election integrity.
Which aspects of the election are judged by the experts? Which criteria do experts
use when judging? Do experts rely on their expertise or also provide their personal
views?
But there are further limitations. Thus far, most expert surveys have been carried out in
established democracies and with experts from established democracies. For instance,
Steenbergen and Marks (2007) asked experts to evaluate party positions on European
integration in 15 countries of the European Union; Hooghe et al. (2010) gathered expert
evaluations of parties’ left-right positions (as well as more specific policy positions) in 24
European democracies; and Castles and Mair (1984) contacted experts in 17 different
established democracies for their research on parties’ left-right positions, with Australia,
New Zealand and the United States being the non-European ones. It could be argued that
the experts in the previous studies share some similarities since they have been subjected to
common institutional contexts: at least political competition in these countries is organised
to an important extent along a left-right scale and there are some common shared beliefs
about ideology (i.e., left-wing parties favour higher taxation and redistribution than right-
wing parties). But what happens with experts from countries outside the Western world?
Do experts everywhere share the same criteria when evaluating complex concepts like
‘democracy’ or ‘election integrity’? Do their judgments depend on the context in which the
election took place?
Hence, when evaluating the validity of expert surveys, researchers face at least three
possible limitations.The first relates to the concept per se; what the respondents understand
to be the object they are evaluating. The second concern relates to expert heterogeneity:
respondents’ individual differences such as their political views or their sources of infor-
mation. The third is the context: does the same problem have the same importance for
experts from different contexts? We will now discuss these three aspects and their impli-
cations for the validity of expert judgments.
We define ‘measurement validity’ as the degree to which the measurements used actu-
ally capture the phenomenon of interest (Adcock & Collier 2001).2 Challenges to meas-
urement validity are most likely to occur when sources of error in data collection are
non-random or systematic. Following this reasoning, we evaluate the validity of expert
judgments by analysing whether there is systematic variation in experts’ answers to ques-
tions – that is, variation that can be explained by question characteristics, expert character-
istics or context characteristics. This approach follows a procedure common in evaluating
the validity of expert surveys, where experts are considered as providing ‘repeated
measurements’ of an underlying concept – in this case, election integrity. Systematic
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variation in answers between experts then indicates potential measurement error
(Steenbergen & Marks 2007).3
Grasping the concept (and its measurement)
Electoral integrity can be considered, much like democracy, an ‘essentially contested
concept’ (Coppedge et al. 2011). Elections are complex processes, and irregularities can
occur at all the different stages of the electoral process: starting from the pre-election legal
framework, registration and campaigning, to the actual voting on election day, to post-
election vote counting and adjudication of results (Elklit & Reynolds 2005). Hence, viola-
tions of election integrity can take many forms, ranging from limitations on the registration
of political parties and candidates, to ballot-box stuffing and much more (Schedler 2002;
Elklit & Reynolds 2005).4 As a result, many alternative definitions exist.5 Schedler (2012:
24) argues that the measurement of such complex concepts cannot reach the ideal of
bureaucratic measurement – ‘a relation of correspondence between the symbolic realm of
arithmetic numbers and the empirical realm of objective attributes’ – because ‘observation
and measurement impose informational demands that cannot be processed through formal
regulation’ (Schedler 2012: 30) and hence ‘the ideal of non-judgmental measurement is
unreachable (Schedler 2012: 26). He advocates expert judgments, based on experts with
local knowledge and analytical and synthetic competence, as the only way to approach the
measurement of complex concepts. Expert surveys seem especially useful for the measure-
ment of a complex concept like ‘election integrity’.6 However, if experts have different
understandings of what the concept is, they will evaluate different objects, resulting in data
that is incomparable. For example, if expert A considers the absence of media bias to be an
important aspect of election integrity, whereas expert B does not consider media bias to be
relevant for election integrity, their evaluations of the same election will be based on
different criteria.
Experts’ heterogeneity
Individual experts’ characteristics such as their level of expertise or political views may also
affect variance in judgments. For example, domestic and international experts could have
different opinions about the electoral process. This may happen because of more extensive
or different types of knowledge about the electoral process of the country involved. For
example, domestic experts are likely to know about the electoral process by experience, and
having had a longer experience with elections in their country they might have more
in-depth knowledge. However, international experts may have been involved in elections as
international election monitors or working in election assistance, and have acquired access
to parts of the electoral process that are less accessible to domestic experts. Apart from the
level of expertise, experts may also differ in their degree of political neutrality. For example,
experts with strong ideological convictions may judge elections differently than nonparti-
san experts, and experts that have been involved in the elections as election officials or
candidates may evaluate the elections differently than experts that have had no such role in
the election.
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Considering the context in which experts evaluate elections
Apart from objects and experts, the third limitation to consider when evaluating experts’
judgments is the context in which experts give their evaluations; they may be context-
bound, limiting the capacity of both concepts and data to ‘travel’ (Sartori 1970). For
example, the threshold for evaluating an election may be lower in countries with a shorter
democratic history than in older democracies, limiting the cross-national comparability of
data. Consider some of the logistical problems that could occur in a country that recently
went through a civil war and is celebrating its first elections, and compare these same
problems – say in the voter registry – in an established democracy. It is likely that experts’
opinions about the quality of the voter registry would be based on different standards of
assessment in Angola than in the United States.
Electoral integrity is a perfect example with which to examine the limitations of expert
surveys mentioned above. First, the object of study poses a challenge as electoral integrity
is particularly complex to define and measure: electoral integrity is a contested and multi-
faceted concept, violations of election integrity can take many forms and many forms of
electoral manipulation are covert. Second, experts’ heterogeneity may be a significant
limitation when evaluating election integrity as there may be differences between interna-
tional and domestic experts, and among experts that have had no role in the elections to
experts that have been involved as election monitors, working in election assistance or even
as election officials or candidates. Third, expert evaluations of electoral integrity may be
conditioned by the context in which evaluations take place.
The perceptions of electoral integrity dataset
The questionnaire
As discussed above, elections are complex logistical operations and election integrity can be
undermined at any step in the process (Norris 2014). The PEI dataset therefore uses a
comprehensive operationalisation of ‘election integrity’ that seeks to reflect all the stages of
the electoral process, ranging from well before election day, to during and after election day.
This helps to ensure that all relevant aspects of the electoral process are taken into account,
mapping the full ‘menu of manipulation’ (Schedler 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler 2002).
The PEI dataset asks experts to evaluate 49 specific indicators of election integrity. The
dataset includes 49 variables measuring 11 dimensions of electoral integrity over the
electoral cycle. The survey instrument encompasses the full electoral cycle, ranging from
the pre-electoral period, the campaign, to polling day and its aftermath, as outlined by the
United Nations (UNDP 2009), Elklit and Reynolds (2005) and Norris (2014).The first three
sections of the dataset look at perceptions of the electoral laws, electoral procedures, and
district boundaries. The next two discuss the registration of voters, and the registration of
candidates and parties. Sections six and seven focus on the election campaign – specifically
media coverage and how the campaigns are financed. Sections eight and nine assess
the balloting process and what happened after the polls closed. The final two sections ask
about the adjudication of the official results and the overall performance of the electoral
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authorities. Response categories vary on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to
‘strongly disagree’. Finally, several questions were asked about the general situation of the
elections, about experts’ familiarity with the elections, and demographic details about the
expert respondents. The survey is available online.7
Collecting 49 indicators on electoral integrity means that the measurement of the
overall concept is very detailed. In this context a note of caution may be raised about the
level of knowledge that this requires from the experts. We will seek to evaluate empirically
to what extent the level of expert knowledge affects the validity of the data gathered in the
next section. However, it is important to note that the PEI questionnaire is quite compa-
rable in this sense to other expert surveys, such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES),
which contains 48 questions reflecting the position of the leadership of the national parties
in 28 countries (Hooghe et al. 2010), and much shorter than the Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem), which captures seven conceptions of democracy in all countries around the world
since 1900, with 329 specific indicators (Coppedge et al. 2011). The advantage of including
49 specific indicators is that it allows researchers to aggregate indicators themselves, accord-
ing to their own conceptualisation of ‘election integrity’, as well as study specific aspects of
the election; hence researchers can select the data to match their research purposes.
The experts
There are a number of definitions of who could be considered an election expert
(Steenbergen & Marks 2007: 350). PEI defines an ‘expert’ as a political scientist (or social
scientist in a related discipline) who has published or who has otherwise demonstrated
knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country. By ‘demonstrated knowledge’
PEI understands one of the following criteria: (1) membership of a relevant research group,
professional network or organised section of such a group; (2) existing publications on
electoral or other country-specific topics in books, academic journals or conference papers;
(3) employment at a university or college as a researcher or professor. For each election, the
PEI survey identified and contacted around 40 experts, seeking a balance between domestic
and international ones. When the number of available domestic experts was limited, as was
the case in some developing countries, PEI relies more on international experts (Martínez
i Coma & Frank 2014).
Implementation
The PEI survey includes almost all national elections that took place around the world
during the second half of 2012 and 2013.A ‘national election’ is defined as an election either
for the executive or the legislature where voters directly vote for the candidate (or party)
on the ballot, and there is general voting (which excludes voting by committee or institu-
tions). In total, 73 elections from 66 different countries were included. A month after the
election was held PEI sent an invitation e-mail to experts to complete the online survey.
PEI sent two reminder e-mails to non-responders with a one week lapse after the initial
invitation. In some cases, when the response rate was too low, an additional e-mail was sent.
The overall response rate – defined as the number of completed surveys divided by the
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number of invitations successfully sent – was 29.5 per cent. This overall response rate
includes countries that are less frequently included in comparative analyses such as Burkina
Faso or Tajikistan. However, the response rate was rather uneven, ranging from 5 per cent
in Mauritania and Sierra Leone, to 64 per cent in Germany and 71 per cent in the Czech
Republic.
Analysis and results
For the analyses we use the data from the PEI dataset currently available, which results in
election integrity data for 73 national elections in 66 countries, coded by 855 experts. Of the
66 countries where expert surveys have been carried out, nine drop out of our analyses due
to low response rate of experts (< five experts) – namely Barbados, Burkina Faso, Congo
Brazzaville, Cuba, Guinea, Mauritania, Micronesia, Sierra Leone and Togo.8 In addition,
one election in Montenegro drops out due to low response rate of experts. This leaves us
with an N of 57 countries, 63 elections and 823 experts. Table A in the online appendix
shows the number of experts per country.
As discussed above, challenges to measurement validity can occur at three levels: the
object, the experts and the context. Following Steenbergen and Marks (2007), we con-
sider experts as providing multiple ‘measurements’ of a latent concept (i.e., ‘election
integrity’).9 If the worst-case scenario is true – that is, experts have different conceptions
of election integrity in mind, experts themselves differ in their expertise and political
views and experts in different countries consider different aspects of election integrity to
be important – we would expect to find high variance in experts’ judgments. Hence,
evaluating the variance in experts’ judgments can give an indication of the degree of
measurement error, as well as the sources of error. Since each expert was asked to evalu-
ate 49 aspects of the electoral process, in our data questions are nested within experts,
and experts are themselves nested within elections and countries. This means the data
have a clustered or hierarchical structure. To analyse the degree of variance in expert
judgments we first carry out variance component analysis, which allows us to assess the
degree of variance at each level (i.e., objects, experts, contexts). We then proceed to
analyse the sources of variance in expert judgments at the level of questions, experts and
elections/countries.10
Variance component analysis
Variance component analysis is essentially a multilevel model without predictors, which
allows us to identify what proportion of variance can be explained at each level.We predict
the grand mean of election integrity across all 49 questions, 823 experts and 57 countries
with fixed effects, and subsequently estimate the variance components at the country, expert
and question levels.Table 1 below shows the results. Clearly, most variation is located at the
question level (68 per cent). This is what we would expect given that election integrity is
measured with 49 different indicators. Nevertheless, there is also substantial variation at the
expert and country levels: about 11 per cent of variance in election integrity scores is at the
expert level and about 21 per cent at the country level.11
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The object: Explaining variance by question characteristics
As discussed,‘election integrity’ is a complex, multifaceted concept, measured with multiple
indicators to cover the full electoral process. However, not all of these aspects may be
equally easy for experts to evaluate. For example, some aspects are quite technical and may
require in-depth knowledge of the electoral administration, such as provisions in the
electoral law for specific groups of voters. Also, even for experts, some aspects may in fact
be difficult to observe, such as the accuracy of the voter register or parties’ access to political
donations.
We will analyse the variance in experts’ judgments for each question separately in order
to evaluate if such differences occur. We first estimate the standard deviation per question
within each election, and then take the mean standard deviation per question across all
elections to get an idea of overall question difficulty. Table B in the online appendix shows
the descriptive results. Standard deviations in question answers range from 0.66 to 1.14,
with an average of 0.97.Table B shows that questions with low standard deviations in expert
evaluations are questions about aspects of the electoral process that require relatively little
technical knowledge and are relatively easy to observe, such as whether the results were
announced without undue delay or whether the election triggered violent protests (stand-
ard deviations of 0.81 and 0.71, respectively, answers given on a five-point scale). Questions
that appear to be more difficult to answer relate to issues that are relatively more difficult
to observe, such as whether parties or candidates had equitable access to political donations
(standard deviation 1.05). Also, questions that require in-depth knowledge of specific
electoral rules, such as whether postal balloting was allowed, generate larger variation in
expert judgments (standard deviation 1.14).12
The degree to which the question is of an evaluative or factual nature may also influence
variance in expert judgments. For example, evaluations of the questions about whether
ethnic minorities or women had equal opportunities to run for office are likely to depend
(at least partly) on how important experts find equal opportunities for such groups
Table 1. Variance component analysis of expert judgements
of election integrity
Parameter Estimate Standard error
Fixed effects
Grand mean 3.217 0.086
Variance components
National 0.399 0.079
Experts 0.217 0.013
Questions 1.290 0.009
Notes: N country = 57, N experts = 823, N questions = 49.
Total N = 35,904. The total number of observations is 823 *
49 = 40,327. However, due to ‘don’t knows’ on some ques-
tions, the number of observations with election integrity
scores is 35,904 (i.e., overall response rate to questions is 89
per cent).
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(standard deviation 1.14 and 1.05, respectively). Likewise, evaluations of the questions
about whether electoral laws (or district boundaries) favoured the governing party are
likely to depend (at least partly) on experts’ partisan orientations (standard deviation 1.06).
On the other hand, questions of a more factual nature – that is, questions that asked about
information that could be empirically observed, such as whether the electoral authorities
distributed information to citizens or whether parties/candidates challenged the results –
appeared to generate less disagreement between experts (standard deviation 0.89 and 0.84,
respectively).13
To test empirically to what degree question characteristics affect variance in expert
judgments, we run a multilevel linear regression model predicting the standard deviation in
question answers. In this model we include a variable indicating whether a question was
likely to be difficult to answer or not (i.e., required in-depth knowledge or not), and whether
a question was of a factual or more evaluative nature (i.e., asked about information that
could be empirically observed or required an evaluative judgment). An example of
a difficult question is ‘Some citizens were not listed in the register, while an easy question
is ‘The process of voting was easy’. An example of a subject of a factual question is ‘The
authorities distributed information to citizens’, while the subject of an evaluative question
is ‘The election authorities were impartial’. We trained a group of coders to classify the 49
questions in terms of difficulty and factuality. Questions on which coders did not agree were
coded as mixed. In addition to these variables, we also include the stage of the electoral
process as a predictor since previous research suggests that irregularities on election day
are more visible than those before or after election day (Carothers 1997; Anglin 1998).
Moreover, we test whether response rates – that is, the number of experts that coded a
question – affects the variance in answers. Table 2 shows the results.
Table 2 shows that questions that are difficult to answer either because the issues are
technical or because the information might not be publicly available (i.e., aspects of voter
registration, campaign finance) generate higher deviation in expert judgments. It also
shows that questions of a more evaluative nature generate higher deviation than factual
questions.14 As expected, questions related to irregularities on or close to election day,
such as the voting process, the vote count and the announcement of voting results, gen-
erate significantly lower disagreement than questions about election integrity in the
period before the elections. Interestingly, questions about party and candidate registra-
tion appear to generate higher disagreement, which may be due to these questions being
more of an evaluative nature and consequently more prone to partisan interpretation.
Clearly, some dimensions of the electoral cycle are more easily measured than others.
Finally, it seems that the number of experts that answered a question also affects
disagreement between them: the higher the number, the lower the deviation in their
judgments.15
The evaluators: Explaining variance by experts
A second source of measurement error in expert judgments of election integrity may be the
experts themselves. They may differ in their level of expertise and knowledge about the
electoral process. We use a measure of self-reported expertise – ‘How familiar are you with
elections in this country?’ In addition, we use the number of questions answered as a proxy
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of their knowledge about the elections, and also take experts’ age as a proxy of expertise.16
Experts may also differ in their degree of neutrality. For example, domestic experts may
come to different conclusions about election integrity than international experts. Also,
experts may have been involved in the electoral process more or less directly – for example,
as an election monitor or activist. To measure this, we evaluate the effect on variance in
expert judgments of the following roles that experts assumed in the election: candidate,
elected representative, election activist or working for an election nongovernmental organi-
sation, election monitor and no role. Moreover, experts from different ideological back-
grounds may judge elections differently or assign more importance to certain aspects of the
electoral process. We assume that experts with more extreme ideological positions, either
on the left or the right of the political spectrum, may vary more than other experts in their
evaluations. We use these independent variables to explain disagreement between experts.
We calculate the deviation of the expert placement from the mean placement by all experts
Table 2. Predicting standard deviation in question scores
Parameter Estimate Standard error
Fixed effects
Factual questiona
Factual −0.120*** 0.024
Mixed −0.053** 0.018
Difficult questionb
Difficult 0.088** 0.031
Mixed 0.092*** 0.021
Election cycle (0–11)c
Electoral procedures −0.049 0.035
District boundaries −0.006 0.036
Voter registration −0.050 0.046
Party and candidate registration 0.117** 0.040
Media coverage 0.019 0.038
Campaign finance −0.039 0.033
Voting process −0.069* 0.034
Vote count −0.124** 0.039
Voting results −0.083* 0.038
Electoral authorities −0.038 0.038
Response rate: Number of experts that answered
question (3–36)
−0.008*** 0.002
Constant 1.119*** 0.046
Variance components
National 0.015*** 0.003
Question 0.099*** 0.002
Notes: Multilevel linear regression models with random intercepts at the country-level. P values: * 0.05;
** 0.01; *** 0.001 (two-sided). N = 3,066 (63 elections * 49 questions = 3,087, 21 missing cases). a ‘Evalua-
tive’ is the reference category. b ‘Easy’ is the reference category. c ‘Electoral laws’ is the reference category.
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in each election, taking the average deviation for each expert over 49 questions as the
dependent variable.17 This gives us a measure for each expert of how much they deviate
from the other experts in their country in answering the 49 questions about election
integrity. Table 3 shows the results.
Expert variance seems to be rather unsystematic as most variables do not significantly
affect variance in expert judgments, which is a good sign in terms of measurement validity.
Variance is lower if experts answered more questions (presumably indicating a higher level
of knowledge about the elections); however, this effect is insignificant. Likewise, variance
tends to be lower among older experts; however, here the contrast with the youngest age
group is only significant for one of the age categories. Turning to differences between
domestic and international experts, variance appears to be lower among domestic experts,
but higher if experts were citizens of the countries whose elections they evaluated; however,
both effects are not significant. As regards partisanship, as expected, if experts were
Table 3. Predicting variance between experts
Parameter Estimate Standard error
Fixed effects
Expertise
Agea (30–39) −0.044 0.034
Age (40–49) −0.042 0.034
Age (50–59) −0.075* 0.036
Age (60+) −0.035 0.038
How many questions answered? (3–49) −0.001 0.002
How familiar with these elections? (1–10) 0.021*** 0.006
Domestic/international
Domestic (0–1) −0.015 0.021
Citizen (0–1) 0.028 0.023
Partisanship
Extreme ideological position (0–1) 0.028+ 0.015
Role in election: candidate 0.274*** 0.078
Role in election: elected representative −0.120 0.089
Role in election: election NGO/activist 0.018 0.030
Role in election: election monitor −0.031 0.034
Role in election: no role −0.005 0.021
Control
Gender: female (0–1) −0.011 0.017
Constant 0.656*** 0.079
Variance components
National 0.009*** 0.002
Experts 0.035*** 0.002
Notes: Multilevel linear regression models with random intercepts at the country-level. P values: + 0.1;
* 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001 (two-sided). N = 741 (823 experts, 57 countries, 82 cases missing). a Age 20–29 is the
reference category.
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ideologically partisan (either placing themselves to the extreme left or right of an ideologi-
cal left-right scale), variance in their answers was higher. Also, being a candidate in the
election one is asked to evaluate significantly increases expert variance. Fortunately, only
very few of the PEI experts were also candidates in the elections they were asked to
evaluate (1 per cent to be precise), but it is an important finding that underscores the
importance of careful selection of experts. Finally, experts’ self-reported familiarity with the
electoral process (coded from ‘not at all familiar’ to ‘very familiar’) has an unexpected
effect on variation in expert judgments. The higher their self-reported familiarity with the
election, the more experts deviate in their judgments of election integrity from other
experts. While this may be due to experts with limited knowledge overstating their famili-
arity with the election, another possible explanation of this finding could be that in highly
polarised electoral contests, it is precisely the experts with high familiarity with the election
that disagree with each other.
The context: Explaining variance by elections and countries
We argued earlier in this article that the context might be a final source of potential
measurement error. Therefore, we now analyse the effects of election and country charac-
teristics on variance in expert judgments. There are several factors that could explain high
variance of expert judgments in different elections and different countries. Regarding
election characteristics, there may be differences between different types of elections.
Presidential elections typically receive more media coverage than parliamentary elections
(though this only applies to presidential systems of course), and this might affect the
accuracy with which experts can evaluate election integrity. Also, if an election is evaluated
by a mix of knowledgeable and not-so-knowledgeable experts, we would expect to find
higher variance in expert judgments than if all experts were knowledgeable. We measure
this by the election-level standard deviation in self-reported familiarity among the group of
experts that evaluated that election. We expect higher variance if there is a mix of not-so-
familiar and very-familiar experts (i.e., higher standard deviation) than if all experts are
quite familiar with the elections. Likewise, we would expect higher variance in expert
judgments if the pool of experts evaluating an election is a mix of domestic and interna-
tional experts, rather than a more homogenous group of just domestic or just international
experts. We measure this by the election-level standard deviation in domestic versus inter-
national experts who had evaluated that election. In addition, partisanship of experts may
also affect variance at this level: if particular elections take place in a context of strong
societal polarisation, such as the recent elections in Venezuela, experts may also be divided
ideologically, and hence we would expect more disagreement between them. We measure
polarisation between experts as the standard deviation of experts’ left-right placements in
each country. Finally, we also test whether variance in expert judgments is lower in elections
of higher integrity as it may be easier to judge an election with relatively few flaws than vice
versa.We take the election-mean of expert scores on all 49 questions as the indication of the
election integrity of that election.
Regarding the country characteristics that might affect variance in expert judgments
on election integrity, we have considered two variables. It might be the case that election
integrity is more difficult to judge in younger democracies as procedures are not set in
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stone yet and experts within a country may differ more in their expectations about the
electoral process. Established democracy is measured as a dummy variable, comparing
first or second wave democracies to third and fourth wave regimes. Economic develop-
ment might also be associated with lower variance in expert judgments. This may be
because in developed economies, on the one hand, administrative capacity to organise
elections may be better developed (which may increase election integrity) and, on the
other hand, both experts and information about the elections may be more widely avail-
able. Economic development is measured using the World Bank classification which
places countries into lower income, lower middle income, upper middle income and high
income categories.
We tested whether these election and country characteristics explain variance in expert
judgments by modelling election and country characteristics in a multilevel model, predict-
ing variation in expert evaluations at the question level and the expert level. Table 4 shows
the results for the model predicting variation in question evaluations. The results at the
question level remain substantively the same, even when controlling for election/country
characteristics, which strengthens confidence in the findings.The results at the election level
are all in the expected direction. Presidential elections indeed generate less disagreement
between experts than legislative elections, as do elections of higher integrity. Also, a mix of
experts who are familiar and not-so-familiar with the elections increases disagreement; as
does a mix of domestic and international experts. However, none of these results are
significant.
The only election characteristic that does significantly affect disagreement among
experts about question scores is polarisation. In elections where experts are strongly
polarized – that is, there is a mix of experts with left- and right-wing ideological positions –
disagreement about election integrity increases. This underlines the importance of asking
about experts’ personal political views as well, and taking these into account when using
data based on their judgments. Turning to country characteristics, in countries that have a
higher level of economic development, as expected, disagreement between experts is lower,
whereas in established democracies disagreement appears to be slightly higher; however,
our results show that none of these effects is significant.
In Table 5, we model variance between experts in their answers to the questions about
election integrity. Again, the results at the expert level remain substantively similar even
when controlling for the election and country characteristics. At both the election and
country level, all independent variables have effects in the expected direction; however,
none of them, except average election integrity, is significant – elections with higher election
integrity generate lower disagreement. Hence it seems that at the level of context, ideo-
logical polarisation between experts and elections of low overall integrity increase the
variability of expert judgments.
Conclusion
We have examined the validity concerns about expert surveys raised by Budge (2000) and
Steenbergen and Marks (2007) with regard to the object of evaluation and expert hetero-
geneity, and have added a third object to consider when using expert surveys: the context.
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Table 4. Explaining disagreement in different elections and countries: question variance
Parameter Estimate Standard error
Fixed effects level 1 (questions)
Factual questiona
Factual −0.120*** 0.024
Mixed −0.053** 0.018
Difficult questionb
Difficult 0.089** 0.031
Mixed 0.094*** 0.022
Election cycle (0–11)c
Electoral procedures −0.047 0.035
District boundaries −0.002 0.036
Voter registration −0.048 0.046
Party and candidate registration 0.119** 0.040
Media coverage 0.021 0.038
Campaign finance −0.038 0.033
Voting process −0.067* 0.034
Vote count −0.122** 0.039
Voting results −0.081* 0.038
Electoral authorities −0.036 0.038
Response rate: Number of experts that answered
question (3–36)
−0.007** 0.002
Fixed effects level 2 (elections and countries)
Election type: presidential (0–1) −0.021 0.026
Mean election integrity (1.7–4.4) −0.033 0.028
Polarisation (0.6–2.7) 0.079* 0.033
Familiarity mix (0.4–2.9) 0.031 0.025
Domestic mix (0–0.5) 0.064 0.079
Established democracy (0–1) 0.054 0.058
Economic developmentd (1–4)
Lower middle income 0.001 0.050
Upper middle income 0.009 0.051
High income −0.099 0.062
Constant 1.039*** 0.124
Variance components
National 0.010*** 0.002
Questions 0.099*** 0.003
Notes: Multilevel linear regression models with random intercepts at the country-level. P values: * 0.05;
** 0.01; *** 0.001 (two-sided). N = 3,066 (63 elections * 49 questions = 3,087, 21 missing cases). a ‘Evalua-
tive’ is the reference category. b ‘Easy’ is the reference category. c ‘Electoral laws’ is the reference category.
d ‘Low income’ is the reference category.
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Table 5. Explaining disagreement in different elections and countries: expert variance
Parameter Estimate Standard error
Fixed effects level 1 (experts)
Expertise
Agea (30–39) −0.038 0.033
Age (40–49) −0.034 0.034
Age (50–59) −0.067+ 0.036
Age (60+) −0.016 0.037
How many questions answered (3–49) −0.002 0.001
How familiar with these elections? (1–10) 0.026*** 0.006
Domestic/international
Domestic (0–1) 0.005 0.021
Citizen (0–1) 0.027 0.023
Partisanship
Extreme ideological position (0–1) 0.027+ 0.015
Role in election: candidate 0.275*** 0.077
Role in election: elected representative −0.137 0.088
Role in election: election NGO/activist 0.003 0.029
Role in election: election monitor −0.041 0.034
Role in election: no role −0.003 0.020
Control
Gender: female (0–1) −0.012 0.016
Fixed effects level 2 (elections and countries)
Election type: presidential (0–1) 0.019 0.022
Mean election integrity (1.7–4.4) −0.067** 0.022
Polarisation (0.6−2.7) 0.035 0.028
Familiarity mix (0.4−2.9) 0.032 0.021
Domestic mix (0.0−0.5) 0.024 0.069
Established democracy (0−1) −0.008 0.042
Economic developmentb (1−4)
Lower middle income −0.028 0.038
Upper middle income −0.016 0.040
High income −0.084+ 0.047
Constant 0.773*** 0.125
Variance components
National 0.003*** 0.001
Experts 0.035*** 0.002
Notes: Multilevel linear regression models with random intercepts at the country-level. P values: + 0.1;
* 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001 (two-sided). N = 741 (823 experts, 57 countries, 82 cases missing). a Age 20−29 is the
reference category. b ‘Low income’ is the reference category.
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We have tested our claims in the most demanding setting, using a complex concept (i.e.,
‘election integrity’) measured in widely varying institutional contexts, with data from over
800 experts on 66 parliamentary and presidential elections, that took place in 2012 and
2013.
Considering the object of evaluation, we find evidence that questions of a factual
nature generate lower deviation in expert judgments than more evaluative questions.
Likewise, we found evidence that questions that are more difficult to answer, either
because the issues are technical or because the information might not be publicly avail-
able (i.e., voter registration, campaign finance) generate higher deviation in expert judg-
ments. In addition, the finding that questions about the registration process generate
higher deviation, while questions related to voting and the closing of polls generate lower
deviation in expert judgments, also seems to indicate that experts are better able to
evaluate irregularities occurring close to, or on, election day. These findings suggest that
the quality of information provided by experts may differ depending on which aspects of
the electoral process they are being asked to evaluate as well as the type of questions
asked.
Looking at the heterogeneity of the experts, we argue that they may differ both in their
level of expertise as well as in their degree of neutrality. We find that expert heterogeneity
does not significantly affect variance in their evaluations of election integrity. Neither being
a domestic or international expert, nor having a high level of knowledge about the election
(as indicated by the number of questions answered and age) proved to be significant in
predicting expert variance. Having strong ideological preferences did appear to affect
variance between experts: those with pronounced left and right ideological convictions
varied more in their answers compared to their colleagues, as did experts that were election
candidates.This underscores the importance of careful selection of experts as well as taking
into account their partisan background.
We also evaluated whether the context in which the evaluation takes place may impact
expert judgments. We have analysed to what degree election and country characteristics
make it more difficult for experts to judge the integrity of elections. Regarding election
characteristics, we explored whether the type of election (presidential or parliamentary),
the ideological polarisation between experts, the mix between familiar and not-so-familiar
experts, the mix between domestic and international experts, and elections with higher
average election integrity affect election level variance in expert judgments. As for country
characteristics, we evaluated whether established democracies and countries with higher
levels of economic development had lower variance in expert judgments of election integ-
rity. While coefficients indicated the expected direction of relationships, almost none of the
election- and country-level characteristics appeared to affect variation in expert judgments.
Only ideological polarisation between experts and elections of low overall integrity appear
to increase the variability of expert judgments. Hence, context does seem to matter, but to
a more limited extent than we initially expected.
Concluding, our general results demonstrate that expert surveys are useful even when
treating complex and multifaceted issues, such as electoral integrity, and even when carried
out in institutional settings as different as liberal democracies and electoral autocracies.
This bodes well for other expert surveys carried out under such conditions, like expert
surveys on democracy or corruption.
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However, our findings also demonstrate the importance of testing the validity of expert
surveys prior to using these data for substantive analyses so that validity problems can be
identified and dealt with. Moreover, our findings underscore the importance of careful
selection of experts and taking into account their partisan background when collecting
expert survey data. Finally, we have explored another possible source of bias to consider:
the context in which the experts respond. This is particularly relevant as expert surveys are
increasingly used at a worldwide scale, requiring concepts and data that can travel. Our
finding that disagreement is higher in precisely those contexts where we also find more
problems with election integrity illustrates the importance of evaluating measurement
validity using, for example, the tests carried out in this article before using such data.
Moreover, more thorough consideration of how the comparability of expert judgments
across countries can be evaluated and improved is important, and techniques such as
‘anchoring vignettes’ (King & Wand 2007) or ‘bridge coders’ (experts coding multiple
countries) can be used to improve expert data as well.
For researchers wishing to use the PEI expert survey data on election integrity, the
analyses presented here demonstrate how one can check for validity concerns and adapt
the data used accordingly. For researchers looking for an overall measure of election
integrity, the data presented here can be aggregated into an overall measure of election
integrity using the mean of all 49 indicators, or multiplicative or weighted aggregation,
depending on the preferred conceptualisation of election integrity (Munck & Verkuilen
2002; Munck 2009). As there is very little evidence of systematic bias in the PEI data, we
believe it provides valid data on election integrity that can be useful for research in this, and
related fields.18 In addition, researchers interested in specific dimensions of electoral integ-
rity, or specific irregularities, can select the indicators of interest and use the disaggregated
PEI data. In this case, variation in answer scores gives an important indication of the
validity of the data used and, on the basis of this information, researchers studying specific
dimensions of election integrity can decide to use only those questions with low disagree-
ment, and researchers studying specific irregularities could decide to exclude scores from
experts with high deviation. Finally, for researchers building new expert surveys, our find-
ings suggest the importance of gathering and analysing as much information as possible
about experts’ characteristics not only in terms of their expertise, but also their partisan
background in order to test and, if needed, control for potential systematic bias in their
evaluations.
Clearly, experts can judge elections and provide a rich source of data on electoral
conduct worldwide. We hope that the data presented here will stimulate further compara-
tive research on political and administrative aspects of elections, and provide novel insights
into how the quality of elections can be strengthened.
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Notes
1. The data, codebook and questionnaire is available online at: http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI
2. Or as Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 15) define it: ‘whether data measure what they are supposed to
measure’. Note that, as Adcock and Collier (2001) outline, validity when defined in this way also
depends on conceptualisation and operationalisation. Since the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity
dataset uses a very thorough conceptualisation of election integrity and operationalises it in a compre-
hensive way (see also Note 4 and later in the main text), we focus our discussion of validity here on the
actual data used to measure election integrity.
3. Of course, in order for this approach to work, it is important to verify to what extent the data indeed
measure a single underlying concept. We report results of dimensional analysis later in the article.
4. In the months before the election, aspects such as constituency and polling demarcation, party and voter
registration, and campaign regulation are important for election integrity. Common irregularities in this
phase are: gerrymandering, inaccurate voter registration lists, exclusion of opposition parties or candi-
dates, unequal access to media and campaign resources, and opposition intimidation. During election
day, aspects such as access to polling stations, vote secrecy and access of election monitors are impor-
tant. Examples of irregularities are: lack of polling stations in rural areas, vote-buying and intimidation
of voters, and ballot-box stuffing. Finally, after election day, important aspects are: counting and
tabulating the vote, resolving election-related complaints and publishing the election results. Here,
problems that can occur are: biased counting of votes and not publishing disaggregate results (Elklit &
Reynolds 2005; Birch 2011). Clearly, elections are complex logistical operations, and election integrity
can be undermined at any step in the process (Norris 2014). The PEI dataset therefore operationalises
election integrity in 11 dimensions that reflect the sequential steps taken before, during and after
election day, which helps to map all relevant aspects of the full ‘menu of manipulation’ (Schedler 2002;
Mozaffar & Schedler 2002).
5. For example, legal definitions emphasise the violations of domestic electoral laws (Lehoucq 2003;
Vickery & Shein 2012); while in public sector management, the governance of electoral processes is key
(Mozaffar & Schedler 2002; Alvarez & Hall 2006; Alvarez et al. 2012). Democratic theorists draw upon
ideals of liberal democracy, highlighting accountability, inclusiveness and transparency (Birch 2011) or
participation and contestation (Munck 2009). Finally, election integrity has also been defined on the
basis of international norms and legal standards (Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and
Security 2012; Norris 2014).
6. In recent years several cross-national datasets have been developed that measure election integrity,
mostly based on coding election reports, news media and historical sources (Elklit & Reynolds 2005;
Lindberg 2006; Kelley & Kiril 2010; Birch 2011; Hyde & Marinov 2012; Van Ham 2012; Simpser 2013;
Donno 2013; Schedler 2013). For an overview and discussion on measuring election integrity, see Van
Ham (2014). Also, citizen surveys that measure perceptions of election integrity, assessments of elec-
toral fraud based on ‘election forensics’ are increasingly common (Levin & Alvarez 2012; Norris 2014).
Many of the cross-national datasets are based on expert evaluations and/or data derived from inter-
national election observers that, especially in more recent years, can be considered experts as well.
Despite the extensive reliance on expert judgments of election integrity, however, little is known about
the validity of such judgments. This article hopes to contribute in this respect as well.
7. See Note 1.
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8. Steenbergen and Marks (2007) also consider five experts as their minimum number of respondents.
Huber and Inglehart (1995) have three as the minimum number.
9. Of course, in order for this approach to work, it is important to verify to what extent the data indeed
measure a single underlying concept. We carried out factor analyses of the 49 questions and these show
a very strong one-dimensional structure in the data, suggesting that indeed these questions provide
‘multiple measurements of a latent concept’. Maximum likelihood factor analysis of the 49 questions
results in a single factor that explains over 80 per cent of variance. Replication datasets and do-files are
available upon request from the authors.
10. Note that we consider the election and country level as the same hierarchical level, resulting in a
three-level hierarchical structure, as currently only five countries have more than one election evalu-
ated by experts. As more elections will be added to the PEI dataset, multiple elections will be nested
within countries, adding a fourth level of variation. Analyses that consider elections and countries as
two different levels give essentially the same results and are available upon request from the authors
(see also Note 1).
11. These percentages are derived simply by adding up the variance components and taking the proportion
of each from the total – for example, for the national level: 0.399/(0.399+0.217+1.291)*100. Note that
since only five of the 57 countries have multiple elections, we do not estimate the election level
separately here. We did carry out variance component analyses with elections as a third level (and
countries as a fourth level); however, this indicated only 2 per cent of unexplained variance at the
election level and hence these results are not reported here.
12. We also checked whether easier questions elicit higher response rates and found that this was the case.
13. Note that this also implies that experts’ partisanship or political ideology may interact with whether
questions are factual or evaluative – that is, disagreement may be particularly high on evaluative
questions if there is strong ideological polarisation between experts. We have tested for an interaction
effect between expert polarisation and evaluative questions in the model presented in Table 4; however,
this interaction was not significant. Model results are available upon request from the authors.
14. Note that the rank correlation between question difficulty and questions’ evaluative versus factual
nature is not very high: Spearman’s rho is 0.249***.
15. It could be argued that this effect of response rate is due to differences in question difficulty: response
rates are lower for more difficult questions (see Note 8). However, since we include both variables in
the analyses of question disagreement in Table 2, the effect of question difficulty on question disagree-
ment is accounted for, and hence the remaining effect of the number of experts answering the question
is due to other reasons. We carried out analyses of the model in Table 2, including an interaction term
between question difficulty and the number of experts answering the question; however, the interaction
term is not significant and the results of the other variables are not altered. Model results are available
upon request from the authors.
16. Using education as a proxy for expertise was not possible as 97 per cent of expert respondents had
graduate-level education.
17. We first calculated the mean for each question within each country, then calculated the deviation of
each expert from that mean (for all 49 questions), and then took the mean of this deviation over all 49
questions.
18. External validation of the PEI data using Freedom House data on the freedom and fairness of the
electoral process indeed shows a high correlation (0.76***). The Freedom House electoral process
scores indicate for each election in 2012 ‘to what extent the national legislative representatives and the
national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections. Countries are graded between 0
(worst) and 12 (best)’ (cf. Quality of Government Time Series Cross Section Dataset, Codebook version
13 May 2013).
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